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PREFACE
John N. Rupp
This year Washington celebrates 100 years of statehood,
and we certainly don't want the State's one-hundredth birth-
day to go by without appropriate salutes. One of the better
ways to commemorate our State's Centennial is this sympo-
sium issue of the University of Puget Sound Law Review.
Without intentionally trespassing on the fields of history
dealt with by the learned authors of the Articles in this issue, I
shall endeavor to preface their writings with what bureaucrats
call an "overview" of a little history and geography.
To those who tend to think of boundaries and sovereignty
as somehow fixed and immutable, I point out that for a long
time it was distinctly possible that where we live now would
become a part of Her Britannic Majesty's Possessions in North
America. Indeed it was not until 1846, a mere 143 years ago,
that there was any certainty that there would ever be a State
of Washington. California was a part of Mexico (it was ceded to
the United States in 1848) and its northern boundary of forty-
two degrees North was not in dispute. Similarly, there was
agreement that the southern boundary of the Russian posses-
sions was fifty-four degrees forty minutes North. But what of
the vast area between those two latitudinal boundaries and
between the Pacific Ocean and the Rocky Mountains? The
British said it was part of Her Majesty's Possessions in North
America. The United States said, "It's ours." Indeed, one of
James K. Polk's slogans in the Presidential campaign of 1844
was "Fifty-four forty or fight!" Polk was elected, but cooler
heads prevailed; the two countries didn't fight, and the Treaty
of 1846 between the United States and Great Britain fixed the
International Boundary at forty-nine degrees North, where it
is today.
All the land south of that boundary to the California bor-
der and west of the Continental Divide of the Rocky Moun-
tains became the United States Territory of Oregon. A few
years later, in 1853, Congress carved out of its northern portion
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the new Territory of Washington. But when Oregon became a
state in 1859, its boundaries were contracted to what they are
now, and everything else in the old Oregon Territory became
part of the Territory of Washington. Suddenly, then, Washing-
ton included not only the land that is now the State of Wash-
ington, but also all of what are now Idaho, western Montana,
and part of Wyoming. Suppose that you lived at Flathead Lake
or near the Grand Tetons and had to transact business at the
Territorial capital. What did you do? Well, I suppose you sad-
dled up, took your rifle and set out. To where? To Olympia!
That, of course, was a bit much, and fairly soon Congress
fixed it by creating the Territory of Idaho in 1863 and that of
Montana in 1864. That was pretty good for Congress because
the country was then preoccupied with the Civil War.
So by 1863, Washington Territory had the same boundaries
as the State of Washington now has. With that matter "set-
tled," statehood was the next step. California had been admit-
ted almost as soon as it was acquired from Mexico. Oregon
became a state in 1859. Even sparsely populated Nevada made
it in 1864. What happened to Washington? Its boundaries
could be defined, it had a large enough population, it was a
fruitful land with ample natural resources, it had good rivers
and harbors, and it was strategically located vis-A-vis Great
Britain. Yet it remained a territory for thirty-six years-from
1853 to 1889. Why?
In the Fall 1988 issue of Washington State Historical Soci-
ety's magazine Columbia there is a short and scholarly article,
"The Long Wait for Statehood," by the noted Idaho historian
Merle Wells. Illustrated with maps and mercifully free of foot-
notes, it takes us through all the tortuous vicissitudes of the
factional, regional, and political circumstances present in the
area that is now Washington, Idaho, and western Montana. I
shall not deal with them in any detail because Wells has done
it for us, and in the Winter 1989 issue of Columbia, Professor
Keith A. Murray's article, "Statehood for Washington," gives
us more information on the subject.
Here's the general idea: (1) There were many diverse
opinions about where boundaries should be and what new
states should be formed. (2) Because the country west of the
Cascade mountains was so different, economically and ecologi-
cally, from eastern Washington, the Idaho panhandle, and
western Montana, it was urged that the two regions should be
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separate states. (3) There was tension between southern Idaho
and the panhandle. (4) The people in Olympia, Vancouver,
Walla Walla, Boise, and Lewiston each wanted their town to be
the capital. (5) At one time there were more miners in the
Idaho panhandle than there were people in western Washing-
ton-that scared the westerners. (6) Shifts in party control of
Congress seemed to come at inconvenient times-a Democratic
Congress was not keen on admitting a state that would "go
Republican," and vice versa. Wells says that in 1876 the Demo-
crats "learned an important lesson that they did not forget."
In that year they agreed to admit Colorado, and Colorado
promptly "went Republican" in the Presidential election. If
Colorado's electoral votes had gone for Samuel J. Tilden, the
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes would not have been elected
in 1876. Wells also reports that as late as 1888 Congress passed
a bill adding the Idaho panhandle to Washington, but that
President Harrison refused to sign it. Finally, in 1889 Congress
admitted five new states: Washington, Idaho, Montana, and
the two Dakotas. The matter was settled, and the new states
knew what they were and could organize and proceed with
business.
As we celebrate our centennial, it is important to note that
Washington's legal history transcends the temporal boundaries
of statehood. Indeed, while it may not be exactly de rigueur
for the writer of a preface to a legal symposium to discuss spe-
cific law, I think it not amiss to invite attention to a Washing-
ton Territory case that in its time was much discussed and was
frequently cited by courts all across the country, but which
now is largely forgotten. The case is Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190 (1888).
The main "actor," although he had been dead for fifteen
years by 1888, was David S. Maynard, a physician and entrepre-
neur who came west from Ohio in 1850 and settled in Seattle
before there was a town there. Indeed, Bill Speidel in his 1978
book, "Doc Maynard," called him "The man who invented
Seattle." As was not uncommon in "The Days of '49," May-
nard left his wife Lydia and their two children in Ohio and
came west alone, by wagon train from St. Louis, to seek his
fortune. On the long journey he befriended a young widow,
Catherine, whose husband had died of cholera on the trip.
In April 1852 Maynard, as a married man, filed for a dona-
tion land claim of 640 acres in what is now part of downtown
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Seattle. Later that year he filed a petition for a divorce from
Lydia, asserting that before he left Ohio he had found her
"lying with" another man. Lydia was never served with the
petition and knew nothing of it for months. The land then was
still a part of Oregon Territory, so the petition was addressed
to the Territorial Legislature in Salem. On December 22, 1852,
the Legislature enacted a statute divorcing Doc from Lydia.
Three weeks later Doc and widow Catherine were married.
Filing for a donation land claim simply gave you an
"inchoate right of possession." To have your claim ripen into
title you had to live on the land and cultivate it for four years.
In due course, in 1856, Maynard filed his proofs. The matter
went clear up to the Secretary of the Interior. He ruled that
Doc's original 1852 claim for 640 acres was proper when made
because he was then married to Lydia, but that they were not
married during all the four years; so Doc was entitled to only
320 acres, the amount that a single man could get. So he
awarded the west 320 acres to Doc and declared the east 320
acres to be "public land." He ruled that Lydia had no interest
in it because she was not Doc's wife during the four years and
that Catherine had no interest in it either for the same reason
and also because she was not Doc's wife at the time of his 1852
filing. Not long afterward two men, Hill and Lewis, got title
patents to the east 320 acres.
After Lydia's death, her two children, as her heirs, sued
Hill and Lewis asserting that the 320-acre tract was rightfully
Lydia's and that Hill and Lewis should be declared to be hold-
ing it in trust for the two Maynard children. To make their
case the children had to persuade the courts that the legisla-
tive divorce was invalid. They lost in the Washington Territo-
rial courts and subsequently lost in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court for two days
and decided one month later. Courts had time in those days.
We were not yet a litigious society. For example, all the cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington Territory in
thirty-six years are contained in three volumes.
The Maynard children's lawyer was Cornelius H. Hanford.
It must have been one of his last appearances as a lawyer, for
soon afterward he became the last Chief Justice of Washington
Territory and, after statehood, the first and only federal judge
in the new District of Washington.
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Neither Hanford nor Mr. Justice Stephen J. Field, who
wrote the Court's opinion, had any trouble with the Secretary
of the Interior's interpretation of the land-grant law. Assum-
ing that Doc's divorce from Lydia was valid, the Secretary was
correct in determining that Lydia had no claim to the land.
But was the divorce valid? Hanford said "No" on three
grounds: (1) Lydia was never served with Doc's petition, or
even notified of it, and hence the legislature had denied her
due process of law; (2) the territorial legislature had no juris-
diction to grant divorces; and (3) marriage is a contract, and
the Organic Act creating Oregon Territory had in it a provision
similar to the "contract clause" of the U.S. Constitution.
Hence, said Hanford, the statute divorcing Doc from Lydia was
a law impairing their contract of marriage and was therefore
invalid.
Those questions are not of much concern to us today. For
example, we all know that our state constitution prohibits leg-
islative divorces. But in 1888 all three questions were matters
of first impression in the Supreme Court, and Maynard v. Hill
became a "landmark case."
On the due process point, the Court said legislatures do
not have to give notice and hold hearings. If a statute deals
with a subject within the legislature's powers, the courts will
not go behind it and look into the circumstances leading to its
passage.
As to the power of the territorial legislature to dissolve a
marriage by statute, the Court said the legislature had power
to deal with all "rightful subjects of legislation" and that mar-
riage and divorce had always been such a subject, starting right
from the power of the English Parliament to enact "bills of
divorcement."
The "contract clause" question was potentially the most
serious and far-reaching. Congress and the federal courts have
no power to grant divorces. If the contract clause extends to
marriage, then the states could not divorce people either, and
the populace would be in what A.P. Herbert called "holy dead-
lock." But the Court wouldn't go for Hanford's argument. It
said that, while marriage is a contract all right, it is also an
institution of public concern, and the contract clause does not
apply to it.
So now you know about Maynard v. Hill. You may never
have occasion to cite it, but perhaps it will add something to
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your enjoyment of our history. And it isn't often that you
encounter in one case three such historic figures as "Doc"
Maynard, Judge C. H. Hanford, and Mr. Justice Stephen Field.
